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Abstract 
Identity Management Systems at UNHCR: From Paper Registration to 
Biometric Data Management 
Mohamed Haian Abdirahman, MPAff, MSInfoStds 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
Supervisor:  Catherine Weaver 
This report examines the evolution of registration operations as coordinated by 
humanitarian organizations to serve the needs of refugee populations. It begins with an 
historical overview of registration by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), previewing an expectation that aid groups address identification demands 
during refugee operations. It then looks at the evolution of data requested of refugee 
populations, addressing the normalization of biometric data collection without meaningful 
governance through procedural documentation. A case study centered on registration in the 
Dadaab refugee complex then frames biometric data within its use by UNHCR and the 
Kenyan government to decrease the number of persons identified as refugees. This report 
concludes with brief recommendations on the creation, verification, and management of 
identification records by humanitarian organizations as conforming to principles that center 
the biometric rights of refugees. 
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Introduction: 
On permanent showing at the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Museum 
in Geneva, Switzerland is the exhibition “Restoring Family Links” (RFL). Designed by 
Diébédo Francis Kéré, RFL demonstrates how documentation efforts by Red Cross and 
Red Crescent (RC/RC) partners have reunited families following conflicts and disasters. I 
first toured the exhibition in May 2017, during a summer internship archiving records of 
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). My work 
was in processing historical manuscripts on refugee camp management in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, exposing me to the complex documentation that shapes initial and long-term 
humanitarian response.1 I was interested to learn how the RFL exhibition communicated 
the global networks built from interactions between non-governmental organizations, 
cooperating government agencies, and beneficiaries of humanitarian aid. What I was 
specifically searching for were stories from the beneficiaries, to put my archival 
processing work into an intimate context that I could draw upon in describing my 
collections.  
I found many stories in the RFL exhibition, yet what drew me back to the 
museum for multiple visits were the records of beneficiaries created during registration 
operations.2 These records consist of identification cards that provide vital information 
(such as name, age, nationality, etc.) pertaining to the registered beneficiary. Perhaps the 
                                                 
1 This documentation includes diplomatic correspondence, administrative budgets, international grant 
proposals, field trip reports, end of mission reports, and many others. 
2 Registration operations are performed to enumerate and collect information on beneficiaries provided 
with humanitarian assistance. These operations range from a high-level population census to the inclusion 
of data on individual beneficiaries into global databases. 
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largest of these historical operations was conducted by the International Prisoners of War 
Agency (IPWA), an organization established by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross to restore contact between populations displaced by World War I.3 A small subset 
of the 400 linear meters of the agency’s archives are displayed in large exhibition cases 
seen immediately upon entering the RFL gallery.  
 
Illustration 1: The International Prisoners of War Agency (1914-1923, courtesy of the 
International Red Cross Museum.4 
While the documents I processed for IFRC dealt with high-level administration of 
refugee camps, the IPWA archives house personal identification records of over two 
million displaced individuals. These records were created by hundreds of volunteers 
coordinating with government agencies to develop a method of tracing individuals back 
                                                 
3 International Red Cross and Red Crescent Museum. “The International Prisoners of War Agency: The 
ICRC in World War One.” International Committee of the Red Cross: 2007. 2. 
4 Germond, Alain. 2013. The International Prisoners of War Agency (1914-1923). Geneva, Switzerland: 
International Red Cross Museum. 
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to loved ones. They demonstrate a life cycle of historical identification documents, 
ranging from the initial use of the index card for registration and reunification, to their 
now archived use as a tool for genealogical research. Past the exhibition cases are 
replicas of consultation tables wherein visitors of the museum can interact with facsimiles 
of card catalogs and large indices that hold names, ages, and other information collected 
from individuals from IPWA’s operational years of 1914 to 1923. Both the scale of the 
operation and the meticulous labor by which individuals were traced speaks clearly 
through these tables, demonstrating how volunteers leveraged paper records to facilitate 
reunification across the continent. 
Another striking registration effort present in the RFL gallery is a wall 
disappearing into a covered alcove ad infinitum, carefully exhibiting photographs of 
Rwandese children posing with identification numbers. As demonstrated with this piece, 
documentation efforts in recent years have expanded in capacity to include more complex 
records, such as photographs and other audio/visual recordings. This is in contrast to the 
index cards of IPWA that provide limited biological data on beneficiaries. We can look at 
the function of these records during the Rwandese operation in a number of ways. One 
example being the procedures regarding unaccompanied minors, with the photographs 
and identification numbers correlating with registration procedures recommended by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for populations identified as 
needing immediate registration.5 Yet regardless of these functions, we can say with 
                                                 
5 See UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Registration: A Practical Guide for Field Staff. 
1994. “Use of photographs in registration” and “Vulnerable groups.” 
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certainty that the hundreds of photographs of Rwandese children in the RFL gallery were 
not exhibited with the subject’s consent. 
I am fascinated by these identifications records, and yet have concerns on how 
their exhibition speaks to the manner in which personally identifiable documentation of 
refugees is handled by humanitarian organizations. My concerns related to this life cycle 
of registration information stems from concerns on how data requested of refugees and 
asylum seekers has changed over time.6 The recent incorporation of advanced technology 
within refugee operations now let’s humanitarian organizations collect and store larger 
amounts of data on refugees than ever before. This includes biometric data, such as 
fingerprints, iris scans, and facial scans, that can be used in tracking and monitoring 
refugees irrespective of their access to paper documentation. The change in data 
requested as part of refugee operations demands a number of questions. What kinds of 
registration procedures are now employed by humanitarian organizations? What broad 
ethical concerns are there in humanitarian organizations collecting such information? 
And if these records are shared with third parties, what procedural standards govern such 
sharing? 
 This report examines the development of registration operations coordinated by 
humanitarian organizations to serve the needs of refugee populations. It begins with an 
historical overview of registration operations by UNHCR, setting the stage for how aid 
groups are mandated to address identification demands during refugee operations. It then 
                                                 
6 This includes biometric data such as fingerprints, iris scans, and facial scans, as well as the collection of 
social media profiles and other data used in capturing an individual’s identity. 
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looks at the evolution of data collected from refugee populations by UNHCR, addressing 
the alarming normalization of biometric data collection. A brief case study centered on 
registration in the Dadaab refugee complex frames these records within their use by 
UNHCR and the Kenyan government, demonstrating how the biometric enumeration of 
refugees works to efficiently exclude populations from access to humanitarian aid. This 
report concludes with brief recommendations on the biometric rights of refugees, 
introducing a way for UNHCR to set a higher standard on managing refugee data. 
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Historical Overview of Refugee Registration 
The years following World War I demonstrated the need for better cooperation 
between European states in addressing large-scale numbers of displaced populations. The 
post-war economic crisis limited the humanitarian response in accommodating 
employment and education opportunities for refugees, leaving hundreds of thousands of 
displaced people with limited social protection.7 In 1921, the League of Nations 
appointed Fridtjof Nansen as High Commissioner for Refugees to provide 
recommendations for a solution. Nansen’s primary objective as High Commissioner was 
securing employment opportunities for Russian refugees, with a noted example of unrest 
in Constantinople demonstrating what tensions arise when people are denied the right to 
work.8 Yet what is most influential from his reports is his conclusion that, despite there 
being funding to transport refugees to willing host states, their lack of identification 
documents prevented them from migrating across borders.  
The solution presented by Nansen is twofold, addressing how host governments 
and the League can better cooperate to ensure refugees possess identity documents and 
the privileges that accompany such records: 
For securing such freedom of movement, on the importance of which the High 
Commissioner fully shares the views expressed at the Conference, two 
suggestions were made: the first, that the necessary papers should be given to 
refugees who had none, by the Governments of the countries where they had 
                                                 
7 White, E. (2017) The legal status of Russian refugees, 1921-1936. Comparativ. Zeitschrift fur 
Globalgeschichte und Vergleichende Gesellshaftsforschung. Available from: 
http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/33611 
8 Nansen, Fridtjof (1922). “Russian Refugees: General Report on the Work Accomplished up to March 
15th, 1922, Issue 3.” League of Nations, Documents Circulated to Council and State Members, C.124 M.74.  
p 5. 
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found a temporary abode; the second, that these papers should be issued by the 
High Commissioner acting on behalf of the League.9 
 
The principle of cooperation in creating identity documents was ratified by the League on 
July 5, 1922, under a resolution titled the “Arrangement with Regard to the Issue of 
Certificates of Identity to Russian Refugees.” The resolution provided specifications for a 
“Certificate of Identification” (colloquially referred to as a Nansen passport) that 
governments agreed to recognize as valid documents for Russian refugees travelling in 
and between signatory states.10 The effectiveness of the Nansen passport in addressing 
barriers to migration faced by refugees led to its expansion in providing other refugee 
populations with identification documents. In 1924, the League passed a resolution to 
provide the estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 survivors of the Armenian genocide with 
Nansen passports.11 This resolution covered those Armenians identified as stateless, 
residing outside the Government of the Turkish Republic, and possessing no other 
nationality.12 By the 1930s, a total of 58 countries accepted the Nansen passport for 
Russian refugees, with 38 accepting the passport for Armenian refugees.13 
 Following the collapse of the League, the United Nations (UN) was formed in 
1945 to provide diplomatic solutions in mitigating future world wars and coordinating 
between an increasing number of international organizations. The previous work of the 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 10 
10 League of Nations. Arrangement with respect to the issue of certificates of identity to Russian Refugees. 
League of Nations, Treaty Series Vol. XIII No. 355. (1922).  
11 Kaprielian-Churchill, Isabel. “Rejecting "Misfits:" Canada and the Nansen Passport.” International 
Migration Review 28, no. 4 (1994): 285. 
12 Ibid., League of Nations A.48.1927 VIII. 
13 Ibid., 285. 
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League was instrumental in shaping the mandate of the UN, leading to the foundational 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As stated below, Article 14 of the 
Declaration details the universal right to protection by asylum:  
(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution. 
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising 
from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations.14 
 
While the Declaration does not detail the rights attributed to those seeking asylum across 
multiple countries, it provides a framework for understanding how all people have the 
right to migrate and exist outside of their country of origin following forced 
displacement. To provide better protection and security for asylum seekers, the UN 
General Assembly passed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Most 
notably in this convention is the first internationally recognized definition of a refugee: 
“A refugee, according to the Convention, is someone who is unable or unwilling to return 
to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”.15 The purpose of this definition was to provide universal protection for all 
people forcibly displaced from their country of origin, rather than relying on the 
identification of select groups to qualify as refugees following a specific situation.16  
                                                 
14 UN General Assembly. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), 
available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html 
15 UN General Assembly. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. United Nations, Treaty Series, 
vol. 189 (1922): 137. 
16 As demonstrated by League of Nations special assistance to Russian and Armenian refugees. 
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 The convention details a number of precedent agreements that signatory states 
must adhere to in recognizing identification documents pertaining to refugees. This 
includes the 1946 Inter-Governmental Agreement on Refugee Travel Documents, as well 
as the 1922 League resolution on Nansen passports. Most important to the scope of this 
report are the agreed upon conventions detailing the recognition of identity and travel 
documents for all individuals recognized as refugees. Article 27 of the convention details 
that “The Contracting States shall issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory,” 
whereas Article 28 obligates signatory states to issue travel documents to refugees, with 
special consideration paid to those unable to obtain such documents from their country of 
origin.17  
In countries not signed to the convention, UNHCR both registers and issues valid 
documentation recognized by signatory states. The principle of cooperation developed 
between the League and host governments in the registration and issuance of 
identification documents is not found in the 1951 conventions, yet is plainly detailed in 
the 1949 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). As detailed in the statute, UNHCR serves a lead role in, “Providing refugees 
with travel and other documents such as would normally be provided to other aliens by 
their national authorities, especially documents which would facilitate their 
resettlement.”18 This is done in cooperation with governments coordinating refugee 
                                                 
17 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 27 & Article 28. 
18 UN General Assembly. Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 14 
December 1950, A/RES/428(V), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f0715c.html 
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operations, and provides a preliminary structure on navigating agreements between 
UNHCR, governments, and other entities. In 1967, the protocols were amended to the 
convention to qualify people as refugees in the years after 1951, as well as to provide 
equal status to all refugees irrespective of when they were classified as such.19 The 
protocols provided more depth to the relationship between UNHCR and signatory states, 
mandating that information be shared between the two entities as a means of protecting 
refugee rights under the convention.20 
 The Conventions remain the core structure in international human rights law that 
recognizes the relationship between refugees, UNHCR, and cooperating governments. 
While the conventions clearly lay out the responsibility of UNHCR and governments in 
registering displaced people as refugees and providing refugees with travel 
documentation, they do not sufficiently limit the means by which registration can occur.21 
The change in technology since the 1961 amendments has broadened the scope by which 
information on people can be captured, allowing for biometric data and other sensitive 
information to be stored and administered by UNCHR. The following section begins with 
an analysis on the rise of standardized registration operations as conducted by UNHCR 
field staff. It then provides an analysis on data collection practices, providing an 
                                                 
19 UN General Assembly. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 31 January 1967, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267. 
20 Ibid., Article 2. 
21 Meaning here that humanitarian organizations and partner government agencies can request all data they 
believe appropriate in facilitating the refugee registration process. 
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overview on how biometric data on refugees has increased following technological 
advances related to the capture, storage, and sharing of data. 
Development of Procedural Standards on Registration  
Refugee registration serves the critical function of guaranteeing that refugee rights are 
recognized in host countries and abroad. As demonstrated by the Restoring Family Links 
program, registration allows for the tracking of displaced persons with the aim of family 
reunification. Documentation provided as part of registration allows refugees access to 
resources within refugee camps such as meal rations and shelters. In many states, this 
documentation additionally provides access to employment opportunities, state housing, 
and other forms of social protection. Because refugees are internationally recognized as a 
protected class, registration additionally provides security against refoulment, defined as 
the expulsion or return of refugees to areas where their life would be threatened.22 
In 1994, UNHCR published its first standards document centralizing information on 
how humanitarian officers in the field should coordinate registration operations. The 
document builds off data collection priorities (such basic refugee biological data) 
determined by the conventions and provides case studies on registering refugees in a 
variety of circumstances. These circumstances include emergency registration at a border, 
full in-camp registration, and dispersed populations/spontaneous settlement. In the 
context of a full in-camp registration (which are conducted in a protected zone that 
refugees can safely access) the following process of collecting information is 
                                                 
22 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement. 
November 1997. 
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recommended: First, to enclose the camp and ensure that movement in and out of the 
enclosure is controlled. Second, to provide each refugee with a wristband, token, or 
gentian violent marker that identifies them as occupying the enclosed camp. Third, to 
collect wristbands or tokens and begin surveying basic household information (such as 
family size, name(s) of dependents, age(s) of dependents) in order to capture a census of 
camp occupants. Lastly to provide refugees with basic registration cards (detailing name, 
age, date of birth, nationality) identifying them as registered with that camp.23 
 Of note in these standards is the time-intensive, analog method for capturing 
information on refugees. The strict separation of responsibilities by UNHCR and 
governments in collecting detailed information from refugees was due in part to 
UNHCR’s limited technological capacity in performing more than a high-level census. 
This is demonstrated by the recommendation against the photographing of refugees, as 
the practice was considered too costly to implement registration operations.24 The 
creation of identification cards was also recommended for only those refugee populations 
that may require additional protection and services (such as emergency nutrition 
supplements and critical health assistance), as officers in the field often lacked the means 
to publish identification cards at their site.25 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 (UNHCR). Registration: A Practical Guide for Field Staff. 23-25. 
24 Ibid., 43. 
25 Ibid. 
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Rise of Biometric Data Collection 
 
Technological advancements made available to UNHCR field staff in the late 1990s 
began to shift data collection methods within refugee operations. In 1999, survivors of 
the Kosovo War were met in refugee camps with a robust registration campaign that set 
the standard for how modern registration would be coordinated.26 Due to the large scale 
nature of the conflict, UNHCR struggled to register all the Kosovan refugees, many of 
whom lacked identification documents when entering a UNHCR camp. In response to 
this, Microsoft Corporation provided volunteer staff, as well as donating millions of 
dollars in software and equipment to help with registration procedures.27 After spending 
an estimated four weeks to customize the software to suit registration needs, Microsoft 
handed to UNHCR its first refugee field kits.  
Microsoft’s field kids provided UNHCR staff with a laptop, color printer, and digital 
camera. An estimated 100 kits were donated to UNHCR for the Kosovo crisis, with the 
capacity to, “[produce] ID cards containing a photograph, signature, and two-dimensional 
bar-code including the coded refugee bio-data.”28 Then Deputy High Commissioner for 
Refugees Frederick Barton describes the acquisition of the field kits as a watershed 
moment in refugee relief history, stating that, “If you think about how we’ve done it for 
the 50 years of the UNHCR’s existence, and probably for years before — essentially with 
                                                 
26 Lodinova, Anna. “Application of biometrics as a means of refugee registration: focusing on UNHCR’s 
strategy.” Development, Enviornment, and Foresight 2, no. 2 (2016): 93. 
27 Microsoft Corporation. “U.N. Official Praises Microsoft Employees for Helping Refugees.” 6 July 
2000.  
28 Lodinova, “Application of biometrics.” 93. 
 14 
paper and pencil and lists of people — then you would think it does fit that description.29 
The success of the field kits in Kosovo led to their being deployed in India in 2000, with 
the stated objective of also rolling them out in Nigeria, Kenya, and Zambia. The kits, and 
the process by which they eased registration, soon evolved into UNCHR’s preliminary 
Project Profile initiative, a strategy to study the optimization of global refugee 
registration.30 
We can understand Microsoft’s involvement in the refugee operation as a 
demonstration of corporate social responsibility, yet still recognize the ways in which it 
developed a market to expand need for its services. Readily available technology that 
could produce identification documents with embedded biometric information 
dramatically changed how UNHCR conducted refugee registration. The limits on what 
information could be stored on identification cards and within registration systems were 
greatly reduced. Rather than a question of staff capacity, the production of documentation 
became focused on what types of information could be requested of refugees, and how 
much. Only five years prior to Microsoft’s involvement with UNHCR, the standard 
recommendation was to strictly limit the use of photographs in building registration 
systems. Yet with advanced equipment and a greater ability to print identification 
documents onsite, UNHCR was given the capacity to make use of digital photography as 
commonplace in registration operations. 
                                                 
29 Microsoft Corporation. “U.N. Official.” 
30 Lodinova, “Application of biometrics.” 93-94. 
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In 2001, UNHCR’s Executive Committee passed general conclusions detailing how 
registration should be guided in the context of refugee operations.31 It explicitly 
recommends that registration be understood as a dynamic process, abide by the principle 
of confidentiality, be conducted non-threateningly, and be coordinated by trained, 
representative staff.32 It goes on to provide new recommended standards for information 
sharing between UNHCR and signatory states: 
[The Executive Committee] encourages States and UNHCR to introduce new 
techniques and tools to enhance the identification and documentation of refugees and 
asylum-seekers, including biometrics features, and to share these with a view towards 
developing a more standardized worldwide registration system33 
 
The vision of a worldwide registration system alludes to UNHCR’s prioritization of 
tracing displaced individuals. With complex refugee operations occurring throughout the 
1980s, UNHCR faced mounting pressure by states to make better use of resources and 
provide evidence of need.34 This consequently led to UNHCR’s preoccupation with 
enumeration, defined as the process of counting refugees in order to balance the supply of 
material aid.35 
 The process of enumeration is a reasonable means of determining how much aid 
to appeal for during a given situation. Yet data collected during the process of 
                                                 
31 It is worth noting these conclusions were passed following 9/11, speaking to the need for heightened 
international security measures in regulating travel across borders.  
32 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Conclusion on Registration of Refugees and Asylum-
seekers No. 91 (LII) – 2001. 5 October 2001, No. 91 (LII) - 2001 
33 Ibid., Article 5, Section C. 
34 Harrel-Bond, Barbara and Efthia Voutira, and Mark Leopold. “Counting the Refugees: Gifts, Givers, 
Patrons and Clients.” Journal of Refugee Studies 5, no. 3-4, (1992): 212. 
35 Ibid., 218. 
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enumeration can be shared with third-parties (such as partner governments) to the 
potential detriment of a refugee’s information security. This is seen by an important 
section of the resolution demonstrating UNHCR’s willingness to cooperate with 
governments in sharing refugee data with the aim of addressing fraud and unauthorized 
migration: 
[The Executive Committee] recognizes the confidential nature of personal data and 
the need to continue to protect confidentiality; also recognizes that the appropriate 
sharing of some personal data in line with data protection principles can assist States 
to combat fraud, to address irregular movements of refugees and asylum-seekers, and 
to identify those not entitled to international protection under the 1951 Convention 
and/or 1967 Protocol.36 
 
This passage demonstrates UNHCR’s willingness to use registration data for multiple 
purposes outside the context of refugee operations. While it is clear that UNHCR values 
the privacy of refugees, there remains a persistent lack of clarity on what types of 
information may be shared with states, and under what circumstances refugees may be 
protected from the sharing of that data.  
The latest version of UNHCR’s registration procedures were released in 2003, and 
supersede the 1994 document. By this point, refugee registration utilizing biometric data 
stored both in document systems and embedded into identification cards had been in 
operation for four years. As can be expected, the new registration policies account for this 
change and provide standards on collecting biometric data. For perhaps the first time in 
its documentation, UNHCR provides clear guidelines on the management of iris scans 
                                                 
36 UNHCR. “Conclusion on Registration.” Article 6, Section F. 
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and fingerprints, as held within its database system.37 The Project Profile initiative, which 
had been initially rolled out in Kosovo, is detailed as the standards database by which all 
refugee documentation should be stored and verified. Perhaps due to the sophisticated 
nature of the database, this guidebook serves as one of the first documents demonstrating 
the expansion of UNHCR’s biometric capture capacity.  
In 2004, UNHCR transitioned away from its Project Profile initiative into a fully 
unified database called proGres (Profile Global Registration System). This database was 
built in cooperation with Microsoft, and remains the core documentation structure used in 
refugee operations to this day. A key point in the development of the proGres system was 
in optimizing the means by which refugee status determination could be completed by 
providing government partners with readily accessible data on registered beneficiaries. 
With proGres, UNHCR reached its vision fairly early on to develop a worldwide refugee 
registration system. The proGres system can be accessed by officers in field locations 
around the world, allowing for everything from the effective enumeration of refugees to 
better account for food rations to facilitating the final stages of an individual’s refugee 
status determination process in a host country.38 
 proGres version 4 is currently in build, with implementation using a Microsoft 
Dynamics CRM solution. Since 2003, proGres has been optimized to better address 
                                                 
37 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR Handbook for Registration: Procedures and 
Standards for Registration, Population Data Management, and Documentation (2003): 141. 
38 Ibid. 
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UNHCR needs pertaining to advanced “registration, population, and case management.39 
Mark F N Franke presents concerns over this advancement in virtualized refugee 
management by UNHCR, stating that it forces the agency to at times go against its 
principles in protecting the human rights of refugees: 
rather than [UNHCR] representing them [refugees] as subjects of rights to whom the 
international mechanisms of human rights protection ought to respond, the virtual 
mapping of refugees intensifies and regularises the manners by which they are 
already plotted out as fixable objects at whom merely humanitarian assistance must 
be targeted.40 
 
While the mandate of UNHCR is to protect the rights of refugees, Franke argues this 
advancement in virtualization makes refugees more vulnerable to structural inadequacies 
that compartmentalize the struggle of forced displacement into a matter of resource 
matching based on registration data. It is very likely that characterizations of refugees as 
“fixable objects” will only increase as the capacity to collect more information is 
incorporated into later versions of proGres. 
 A 2017 evaluation by the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services echoes 
Franke’s concerns regarding the structural problems that occur in this hyper virtualization 
of refugees. During case reviews of registration operations, evaluators found evidence 
that refugees who refused to register with UNHCR experienced an “exclusion error.” One 
example of refusal was done on the grounds that the refugees feared their data would be 
shared with the government persecuting them. Because of their refusal, they were 
                                                 
39 UN High Commisioner for Refugees. “Request for Proposal: RFP/2015/723: For Establishing Frame 
Agreement(S) for the Provision of Microsoft Dynamic CRM Skills.” (2015): 4. 
40 Franke, Mark F. N. “Refugee Registration as Foreclosure of the Freedom to Move: The Virtualisation of 
Refugees' Rights within Maps of International Protection.” Environment and Planning D Society and Space 
27,  no. 2 (2009): 361. 
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consequently denied access to assistance and protection.41 Much can be read in these 
episodes of exclusion error. The fact that enumeration has become such a dominating 
factor in humanitarian service that refugees who refuse to register as part of the process 
are denied services is alarming. Perhaps most troubling is UNHCR inability to guarantee 
refugee populations that that information shared by them would be protected from 
extraction by the potentially harmful parties. 
 The evaluation presents a number of recommendations for UNHCR to follow in 
optimizing its registration system. Two recommendations are key in UNHCR addressing 
biometric data management within its proGres system. The first is updating its 
registration procedures guidebook. There have only been two editions of the procedures 
(1994 and 2003), failing to keep up to speed with protocols on handling the large 
amounts of personal refugee data now collected by UNHCR.42 The second deals with 
UNHCR honing its data collection practices to ensure it only collects data most relevant 
to its needs.43 This recommendation is particularly nuanced, interpreted throughout the 
evaluation in a number of ways. It primarily addresses the importance of registration as 
effectively capturing data used to “measure the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of 
inter-agency humanitarian action,” meaning here enumerative data that ensures an 
optimal use of funds. Yet there remains a constant thread in the report that imagines how 
                                                 
41 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Evaluation of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for 2017. 21 March 2017, E/AC.51/2017/10. 31. 
42 Ibid., 32. 
43 Ibid., 33 
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registration and more effective data collection could address problems not yet known to 
UNHCR, providing refugees with aid they themselves were not aware they needed.  
 Registration by UNHCR has often times been complicated by a grey relationship 
between what authority is given to whom in the registration process. The recent 
evaluation examines the murkiness of this process in detail, providing examples in 
Jordan, Ecuador, and Kenya wherein parties ranging from refugees, humanitarian 
officers, and government officials were unclear as to who had the authority to do what.44 
This confusion is compounded by a lack of standards on what types of information is 
expected to be shared between UNHCR and host governments. The evaluation found that 
of the twelve countries that formed part of the analysis, nine had memorandums of 
understanding explicitly on data sharing. However, a lack of standardization in how 
MOUs are handled demonstrates that while they can be written, they are only as good as 
they are acted upon.45 
Critical Overview: Biometrics and the Digital Refugee Body 
 This section addresses the current state of biometric data collection pertaining to 
registration as conducted by UNHCR. Detailed evidence on what types of information is 
requested and how they are used can be found in the later case study of the Dadaab 
refugee complex. At the time of writing, there have proven to be few critical studies 
tracing the rise of biometric data collection by UNHCR. Perhaps the clearest voice in 
studying this phenomenon is Katja Lindskov Jacobsen. In her article “On Humanitarian 
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Refugee Biometrics and New Forms of Intervention”, Jacobsen outlines the dangers of 
how UNHCR’s attentiveness to biometric refugee registration potentially extends the 
power of states over refugees, rather than guarding them against intrusion and violence. 
The digital refugee body, as Jacobsen describes it, becomes vulnerable to unwarranted 
search and seizure by state authorities.46 The dangers of readily accessible documents 
uniquely attributed to refugees opens a new domain on interventions that has not been 
explored, and brings with it an increased risk of abuses directed towards refugee 
populations. As Jacobsen states:  
it seems that what gets constituted in these debates about the legitimacy of 
intervening in the digital refugee body is not so much the meaning of acceptable 
and unacceptable forms of statehood, but rather the meaning of acceptable and 
unacceptable forms of life – whose digital bodies it will accordingly be 
illegitimate or legitimate for states to intervene in.47 
 
Conceptualizations of the security state demarking individuals as “safe” and “unsafe” is 
directly correlated with Jacobsen’s concerns on illegitimate and legitimate digital refugee 
bodies. In the context of a global war on terror that creates hyper-secure borders and 
indefinitely jails asylum seekers without bond hearings, the power of registration 
documents recognizing inalienable refugee status cannot be understated.48 Jacobsen goes 
on to state that, “the belief that biometrics can identify terrorists ‘disguising themselves 
as refugees’ depends on a constitution of digital refugee bodies as legitimate targets of 
                                                 
46 Jacbosen, Katja Lindskov. “On Humanitarian Biometrics and New Forms of Intervention.” Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding 11, no. 4, (2017). 540  
47 Ibid., 544. 
48 See: Montanaro, Domenico et al. “Supreme Court Ruling Means Immigrants Could Continue To Be 
Detained Indefinitely.” NPR.org, 27 February 2018. 
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intervention prior to or indeed irrespective of any ‘unsafe’ undertaking.”49 The a priori 
expectation of states to  use biometric registration records remains a high concern in 
refuge information privacy studies. Yet UNHCR remains slow in addressing these 
concerns, as evidenced by the 2017 OIOS evaluation.  
 In 2013, UNHCR launched large scale testing of biometric registration at sites in 
Malawi under an initiative called the Biometric Identity Management System (BIMS). 
Processes used as part of BIMS registration include fingerprint and iris scanning, using 
equipment and staging grounds to facilitate facial recognition programs.50 After success 
in Malawi, BIMS was rolled out to UNHCR Thailand, with the expectation that future 
sites would be selected. It is not readily clear how BIMS will be incorporated into the 
proGres system, or if it will remain operational outside proGres initiatives. Yet despite its 
special status within global operations, BIMS provides further evidence of UNHCR’s 
struggle to situate consent and confidentiality as a core standard in its registration 
procedures.  
A 2016 OIOS evaluation of BIMS echoes many of the concerns present in the 
evaluation of refugee registration at large. The first main concerns deal with 
communication to refugees on what information is required of them and how it will be 
used. Four of the five country operations studied in the evaluation are described as having 
inadequate public information practices, with critical information being misrepresented 
                                                 
49 Jacobsen. “On Humanitarian Biometrics.” 544. 
50 UN High Commissioner for Refugees. “Biometric Identity Management System: Enhancing 
Registration and Data Management.” UNHCR’S Division of Programme  Support and Management Key 
Initiative Series. 2016. 
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during initial registration procedures.51 Examples of this include UNHCR officers in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Chad including an acceptance query as part of 
the interview script that asks, “whether the refugees accepted that their personal 
information could be shared with the government or other UNHCR partners.”52 This is in 
sharp contrast to information provided to refugees in Thailand, where interview scripts 
communicated to registrants that UNHCR was, “ obliged to confidentiality and that 
information provided by the person of concern would never be shared with anyone from 
the country of origin or other organization without the consent of the person of 
concern.”53  
The false nature of UNHCR Thailand statements can be seen in the regular 
transfer of refugee personal data to the Thai government. These transfers were conducted 
without an assessment of the government’s data protection protocols or through signed 
data transfer agreements.54 Lack of confidentiality can also be seen with UNHCR staff in 
DRC transferring lists of refugee students living in DRC to UNHCR officers in the 
Central African Republic. It is not clear whether this transfer was conducted by means of 
data transfer agreements, yet the audit makes clear the government of the Central African 
Republic was a recipient of these transfers, potentially endangering the students later 
on.55 
                                                 
51 UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Audit of the Biometric Identity Management System at the Office 
of the United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees AR2016/163/03. (2016): 10. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 11. 
55 Ibid. 
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 Central to the audit’s evaluation of BIMS is a lack of conformity to and limited 
knowledge of UNHCR’s “Policy on the Protection of Personal Data of Persons of 
Concern to UNHCR.” Published in 2015, this document serves as the most recent 
framework by which data related to “Persons of Concern” (including refugees, asylum 
seekers, internally displaced populations, and others provided with UNHCR aid; hereafter 
Persons) can be handled to protect against abuse. While UNHCR’s registration 
guidebook has not been updated since 2003, its personal data protection policies provide 
new mandates on data security in a humanitarian context. Of relevance to the scope of 
this report are the document’s guiding principles related to consent, privacy of data, and 
transfer of data to third parties in collecting data from Persons.  
 Consent is a central component of the policy document, and all Persons must be 
given the opportunity to consent to having their data collected, transferred, and 
changed.56 The means by which consent is determined includes a written or oral 
statement, or an otherwise clear affirmative action. While the means for interpreting 
consent are laid out, what is not made clear is how consent is collected and stored. As 
stated earlier in this report, proGres v. 4 is described as allowing Persons to detail what 
points of data they consent to having collected, yet this functionality is not detailed in the 
report nor are other means of verifying consent after the fact present. 
 Like consent, privacy of data is a fundamental component of the guiding policies. 
Officers in charge of collecting data must ensure that information is stored in a secure 
                                                 
56 UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Policy on the Protection of Personal Data of Persons of Concern 
to UNHCR. (2015): 19-20. 
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location, and that all communications sharing the data be sent over secure channels.57 The 
importance of confidentiality is stressed even after the end of a Person’s involvement 
with UNHCR, and plays a large factor in policies regarding data transfer to third parties. 
UNHCR employs a broad mandate to transfer data in a full and complete form to third 
parties, as demonstrated by special policies regarding transfer of data to national or 
international law enforcement officials. As the policies state, UNHCR reserves the right 
to transfer data to aid law enforcement officials in, “the detection, prevention, 
investigation, or prosecution” of a crime.58 A number of contingent requirements appear 
to scope the release, including that “[t]ransfer does not disproportionately interfere with a 
data subject’s or another [Persons] right to privacy or other human rights,” yet this is 
difficult to reconcile given the broad mandate of transfer in seemingly all 
circumstances.59  
While the report strongly emphasizes that transfer only be conducted when there 
are clear agreements between UNHCR and the state, the OIOS evaluation demonstrated 
registration and data sharing does not always occur in these circumstances. Even when 
these transfer and general data generation agreements exist, the evaluation points out they 
mean only as much as UNHCR’s ability to enforce compliance. A number of cases 
demonstrate how UNHCR potentially lacks teeth in protecting its biometric data as donor 
states (including its biggest donor, the United States) push for increased global biometric 
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58 Ibid., 38. 
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registration.60 UNHCR needs to demand compliance with its data management policies 
before allowing partner governments access to biometric data. Even demanding that 
donor states treat refugee biometric data in a manner similar to that of biometric data 
obtained from their citizens would offer more protection than the disingenuous nature of 
UNHCR’s current transfer protocol. 
Biometric management policies within UNHCR have a long way to go in 
adequately addressing the realities of what it means to create, use, store, and share data 
collected from refugees. Technological advancements in less than twenty years have 
already presented UNHCR with huge amounts of data, and more problems compounded 
by similar advancements may arise in as many years. Yet the difference between where 
UNHCR is now vs. where it was in 1998 is that it has a better picture of how those 
advancements may impact the populations it is mandated to protect.  
The current policies, wherein UNHCR is able to share data with national and 
international law enforcement officials without a court order is one that prioritizes 
maintaining relationships with such authorities rather than one that seeks to protect 
refugees first. By developing and enforcing strong data protection policies now, UNHCR 
would be prepared to mitigate what it means for third parties to have access to refugee 
biometrics. And most importantly, as recommended by the OIOS evaluation, UNHCR is 
long overdue in updating its 2003 guidebook on registration procedures. There are simply 
too many technological and political pressures (i.e. the pressure to collect as much data as 
                                                 
60 See Nillasithanukroh, Songkhun. “Rethinking the Use of Biometric Systems for Refugee Management.” 
Chicago Policy Review. 24 February 2016. 
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possible) guiding UNHCR’s work in the absence of clearer procedures for field offices. 
The process of registration and biometric data management presents a number of actors 
who all have strong interests in how that data is used. I argue that refugees have first 
claim in determining how their data is used, yet the realities with regard to biometric data 
prioritizes the needs of states and humanitarian officers (likely the same in other aspects 
of humanitarian assistance). The following section demonstrates how these pressures 
shape humanitarian intervention in respect to the Dadaab refugee complex. It serves to 
better frame how technological changes in registration operations have allowed for new 
forms of humanitarian intervention as guided by the external pressures. 
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Case Study: UNHCR and the Government of Kenya’s Use of Biometric Data in 
Dadaab 
 
The Dadaab refugee complex was opened in 1991 by UNHCR, initially serving as 
a collection of transit camps for populations fleeing Somalia during the early years of the 
civil war. The camp was opened in Garissa County, Kenya, a historic Somali territory 
ceded to Kenya by British authorities following 1960s post-colonial transition.61 Nearly 
thirty years of instability in the region forced the temporary transit camp to grow into a 
large network of what are now four camps: Dagahaley, Ifo, Ifo 2 and Hagadera.62 The 
complex has a current population of 235,269 comprised of multiple generations of 
Somali, Sudanese, Ethiopian, and other nationalities that have been born in or are forced 
to reside in the camps due to protracted security situations within the region.63  
The foundational relationship between registration and refugee status 
determination between UNHCR and hosts governments was difficult to navigate for a 
number of years in Kenya. In 1993, the Kenyan government discontinued its refugee 
status determination procedures (RSD), a critical step in the registration process that 
protects displaced persons under the international refugee conventions and protocols.64 
Sporadic RSD procedures were conducted in the years that followed, leaving only some 
refugees covered by conventions. To address the gap in Kenyan legislation, UNHCR both 
                                                 
61 First, see: Somali elders. Then, perhaps see: Vallat, Francis. First report on succession of states in 
respect of treaties: International Law Commission twenty-sixth session. (1974): 20. 
62 UN High Commissioner for Refugees. “Dadaab Refugee Complex.” Unhcr.org (2018). 
63 Ibid. 
64 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Analysis of Refugee Protection Capacity – Kenya. 
(2005): 4. 
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registered and performed RSD procedures for all refugees in the Dadaab camp. This was 
changed in 2006, when Kenya began a transitional period to start up its RSD 
procedures.65 
A consequence of Kenya once more serving a procedural role in RSD is that 
refugee registration in Dadaab was tightened to ensure an efficient use of resources. 
Beginning in 2007, the Kenyan government and UNHCR began actively collecting 
fingerprints from refugees to ensure there was no double registration.66 This additionally 
served the purpose of ensuring that no Kenyan citizens were being registered as refugees, 
a potentially difficult problem given the areas majority population being historically 
Somali.  
The difficulty in ensuring no double registration was compounded by a regional 
drought in 2011 that forced large numbers of Kenyans in the areas to register as refugees 
in order to receive basic aid.67 In an effort to once more get a controlled handle on 
refugee registration, the Kenyan government and UNHCR rolled out en masse biometric 
registration operations. Beginning in 2016, these operations included fingerprinting as 
well as iris scans to provide two-factor authentication in the initial registration process.68 
This operation proved the first instance of UNHCR’s use of BIMS to collect and store 
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both fingerprints and iris scans in Dadaab. By September 2017, over 20,000 individuals 
in Dadaab had been registered through BIMS.69 The biometric records collected from 
refugees are available to the Kenyan government through data sharing agreements that 
grant access to UNHCR’s database.70 It is not clear what the extent of this data sharing is, 
yet the initiative for it likely has to do with Kenya’s years-long effort to close Dadaab and 
ensure refugees do not return. 
Kenya has an aggressive record in mitigating the return of refugees to Dadaab. 
This is despite the fact that instabilities such as conflict, drought, and low economic 
opportunities dramatically affect the quality of life for the region’s population. In 2014, 
UNHCR and the government of Kenya began incentivizing voluntary repatriation by 
offering support to refugees leaving Dadaab.71 Yet due to the lack of social protection in 
Somalia, many refugees have been forced to return to Dadaab. In response to this, the 
Kenyan government prohibited UNHCR from once more registering returnees as 
refugees in Kenya.72 A government official in Kenya explained the reason behind this 
decision as follows: "If we repatriate 1,000 but then 1,000 new arrivals come, we would 
not be getting the job done."73  
The job referred to by the Kenyan official is the closure of Dadaab, 
communicated in a language of enumeration that privileges the absence of refugees. The 
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71 UNHCR. Operational Update. 1. 
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consequences of this are thousands of persons who qualified as refugees before their 
voluntary repatriation are now living in the Dadaab complex unregistered.74 The 
phenomena of purposefully not registering refugees demonstrates concerns addressed 
earlier in this report on government preoccupations with enumeration rather than with the 
care of refugees. This focus of enumeration disenfranchises legitimate refugee claims 
from being addressed, locking out the unregistered populations in Dadaab from resources 
to which they are lawfully entitled. 
 In the context of Dadaab, UNHCR’s optimized biometric registration database is 
being employed to facilitate large scale exclusion tactics that deny individuals their 
internationally protected right to be recognized as refugees. Kenyan officials are pairing 
this with intimidation tactics that cause those unregistered in Dadaab to remain dislocated 
from services and community life, in fear that if they seek out such services they will be 
refouled to their country of origin.75 In 2017, Kenyan officials announced they would not 
pursue plans to close Dadaab in the immediate future. Yet previously registered 
individuals continue to be denied the right to live in Dadaab as authorized refugees. 
 The Kenyan government could not have mandated biometric registration without 
UNHCR’s cooperation. Over the course of their partnership, there were at times distinct 
priorities between the two parties in guiding for biometric adoption. UNHCR sought to 
conform Dadaab with its global standards for refugee registration, in order to present to 
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 32 
donor countries a better representation of needs. This key priority aligned with those of 
the World Food Programme (WFP), who sought to optimize food distribution in Dadaab 
by tackling the issue of enumeration and refugee registration. Beginning in 2013, 
UNHCR and WFP signed an MOU to begin food distribution operations in Dadaab as 
facilitated by biometric identification, setting a new standard in country for how food 
distribution would continue.76 
A 2015 evaluation titled “Joint Inspection of the Biometric Identification System 
for Food Distribution in Kenya” addresses how the operation was coordinated and 
included recommendations for what needs to be changed in the future. UNHCR was able 
to modify its biometric system developed in 2007 to accommodate food distribution, and 
developed with WFP a business process in distributing food around that system. In brief, 
the process consisted of having authorized beneficiaries with biometric data in the 
proGres system go through the distribution center to collect their food items, with their 
biometric data validated at designated points. The following excerpt from UNHCR and 
WFP’s Joint Inspection of the Biometrics Identification System for Food Distribution in 
Kenya describes this process in more detail, providing information on how the initiative 
designated registrants as authorized to collect food: 
A genuine food collector is classified as any member of a refugee household (or 
an alternate) whose profile is recorded in the proGres database and is 15 years of 
age or older. If the match is positive, the ration card is embossed and the food 
collector is granted access to the food distribution corridor. The staff at reception 
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desk checks each index finger twice… The positive or the negative match is 
recorded in [proGres]. 77 
 
Overall, the initiative was considered to be a success, and a model for how joint 
operations can be handled in other countries. By 2014, the program had identified 80,000 
beneficiaries in both Dadaab and Kakuma who did not qualify for food distributions. The 
final results of the operation led to an estimated savings of USD $1.4 million/month. 
 A key component of the operation was in the sharing of biometric data between 
UNHCR and WFP, leading to the method of using biometric data in the regular practice 
of food distribution rather than at the initial moment of registration. This reflects the 
earlier mentioned concept of biometric data as collected with the potential that it may 
lead to new forms of intervention in the future. While the information may continue to be 
collected, the evaluation provides evidence of two challenges that appear frequently in 
UNHCR’s handling of biometric data. The first is that MOUs between WFP and UNHCR 
remain unaudited since initial signing in 2011, failing to account for foundational 
changes to biometric data security such as UNHCR’s 2015 personal data management 
procedures.78 A more recent evaluation of the food distribution problem has not been 
conducted, but it is likely that similar issues lack of implementation will echo the 2017 
OIOS evaluation of registration.  
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 The second challenge is more widespread, and deals with the direct handling of 
the data as inputted by officers onsite. Recommended encryption tools are not used in 
laptops in the distribution center, and there has been no network analysis onsite to 
determine that data sent from the center to other computers is secure. Data directly 
entered onsite includes that information used when refugees are denied food distribution, 
for problems ranging from a bad read of their finger to declarations of their lack of 
authorization in acquiring food.79 This process demonstrates that biometric data as used 
for authorization no longer presents simply an “exclusion error” for those refugees not in 
the system. The error in earlier cited operations was due to refugees refuging to register 
their information. Yet now, even those refugees who have an internationally recognized 
right to access humanitarian services and have registered with UNHCR are structurally 
disenfranchised from aid. This disenfranchisement could only have been facilitated by 
means of biometric data capture, and speaks to the potential for humanitarian 
organizations to leverage this data in future operations.  
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Conclusion: Recommendations on Biometric Data and Refugee Rights 
 This report has studied the rapid implementation of biometric data as part of 
UNCHR’s refugee registration operations. Over the past twenty years, there have been 
few global standards in ensuring that biometric data is protected so as not to harm 
registered refugees. This lack of protection is best evidenced by two common problems: 
1. A lack of understanding across all UNHCR sites on disclosing to refugee 
registrants the security standards governing access and use of their data 
2. A frequent lack of written agreements between operational partners regarding 
the sharing and administration of biometric data, allowing for information to 
be utilized without adequate governance. 
The context of these problems has been addressed throughout this report, yet bears 
repeating here. Pressure from international donors to better administer humanitarian 
operations has led to an over-prioritization of enumeration, wherein beneficiaries of aid 
are strictly delimited in order to conserve resources. I say over-prioritization to speak to 
the previously mentioned concept of beneficiaries as fixable objects, a term used to 
precisely locate and define authorized beneficiaries and the resource-oriented ways they 
can be aided. This notion of fixity is in direct conversation with the global movement to 
track migration and prevent the unauthorized movement of humans across borders. As 
demonstrated with the example of UNHCR sharing biometric data of student-aged 
refugees from Uganda to partner authorities in the Central African Republic, the 
compulsion to fix refugees into designated spaces is global in its scope and potentially 
leaves them vulnerable to heightened surveillance by the state. 
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There have been many recommendations within the audits of UNHCR’s registration 
operations that provide meaningful alternatives to current data management practices in 
the field. The most common of these recommendations include better documentation 
regarding the sharing of biometric data, as well as better conformance to 2015 policies on 
managing personal data. Yet what is missing from these recommendations is the explicit 
authority that refugees have to be the sole owners of their biometric data. This is not a 
radical concept. Few records are as personal as those generated through biological 
processes. As more advanced methods of documenting identity are normalized, there 
needs to be established a professional culture that recognizes the deep intimacy between 
this data and an individual’s identity.  
Recent scholarship in the field of archives and records management has sought to 
reorient the notion of custody associated with records from beneficiaries of state services. 
A 2017 report titled “Setting the Record Straight: For the Rights of the Child” details an 
Australian initiative to center the record-keeping rights of children who have been part of 
out-of-home-care by the state. The purpose of the initiative is to ensure that record-
keeping practices associated with out-of-home care operates within a system that protects 
children, not one that facilitates their abuse and neglect through the mismanagement of 
data.80 The Rights of the Child initiative has a national scope working to reorient the 
relationship between records creators (including children, parents, caseworkers, and 
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various officials) in order to detail their needs as situated within the context of the rights 
of children out-of-home. 
There are distinct corollaries between children out-of-home and forcibly displaced 
refugees. These are relative to the means by which a large number of records creators and 
other stakeholders seek to create policies affecting access, use, and security of data for 
populations under the social protection of the state. Future scholarship in the field of 
refugee studies has an imperative to place the entirety of the Rights of the Child (RoC) 
framework atop those concerning the biometric rights of refugees.81 For the context of 
this report, the framework will be applied to the frequently cited problems arising from 
the global rollout of UNHCR’s biometric registration operations. The following section 
provides a list of three recommendations to begin a conversation on how archives and 
records management ethics can help to reorient the rights that refugees have regarding 
their biometric data. 
Recommendation 1: Deletion of Biometric Data Following the Intervention 
RoC Framework: Memory Right, “The right to be forgotten.” 
 Refugees have the right to full control over their biometric data, most notably in 
the time following an intervention. “Deleting” here is understood as the full and complete 
destruction of biometric data from UNHCR’s electronic and physical recordkeeping 
systems. This control should be evidenced by UNCHR deleting upon a refugee’s request 
any biometric data contained within their global registration systems. The purpose of 
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deleting this data is to ensure that biometric records collected by UNHCR serve the sole 
function of providing humanitarian assistance during localized operations. While the 
right to be forgotten is here reserved for those who request the service, the potential for it 
to include all biometric records following an operation is a possible solution for the 
future. 
Recommendation 2: Baseline Disclosure Language Shared Across UNHCR Sites 
RoC Framework: Proactive Disclosure, “Be informed of when and why others are given 
access to your records.” 
 Refuges have the right to access baseline disclosure language communicating to 
them the limits of UNHCR’s biometric data security. This statement should be disclosed 
during the in-take and registration process. As it is a baseline statement, it would not need 
to go in-depth regarding the management and sharing of that data with country 
authorities. Rather, it would provide a high-level understanding that UNHCR is obligated 
to share this information with authorities in certain circumstances. The importance of a 
baseline disclosure statement shared with UNHCR field offices would better address the 
communication errors stemming from field staff falsely disclosing full confidentiality 
while maintaining a data sharing partnership with government authorities.  
Recommendation 3: Secondary Authentication Methods to Prevent Exclusion Error 
RoC Framework: Participation Rights, “Decide what is recorded about you in 
organizational systems.” 
 Refugees have the right to reject registration through biometric means and still be 
provided with humanitarian assistance. When biometric authentication fails, refugees 
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have the right to be authenticated using alternative methods. The notion of exclusion 
error, wherein beneficiaries of aid are excluded from services due to circumstances 
related to registration, has been evidenced in multiple UNHCR refugee operations.82 
UNHCR has an obligation to adhere to the conscientious objection of beneficiaries who 
refuse to register their biometric data. Refugees have the right to demand secondary 
authentication methods other than biometric registration in order to obtain services. This 
secondary authentication includes the use of documents, cards, tokens, wristbands, or 
other forms of non-biometric records that credibly validate a refugee’s status and grants 
them all humanitarian benefits.  
Final Reflections 
 An ethical response grounded in the biometric rights of refugees can help 
UNHCR to grapple with what it means to have collected huge quantities of biometric 
data from refugees. The dangers in an expansion of biometric data within refugee 
registration operations do not come from their presence, but from their poor governance. 
The use of biometric data to exclude populations from humanitarian assistance should be 
fought with a more nuanced approach that ensures a refugee’s internationally recognized 
rights are not stripped from them. As demonstrated by the Rights of the Child initiative, 
critical archivists and records managers can inform decision making on reframing data 
practices to account for social reform and the meaningful care of populations. We can 
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hope that as UNHCR updates its procedural documentation regarding the management of 
biometric data, critical records management principles will be referenced to better center 
the biometric rights of refugees. 
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